Post-Empiricism and Philosophy of Science

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide some sketchy remarks on the post-empiricist phenomenon in philosophy of science, taking into account the themes of the relationships between language on the one side and reality on the other, and the parallel problem of the alleged elimination of metaphysics. Unlike the logical empiricists, Popper believes that a clear separation between (i) analytic and synthetic sentences, and (ii) between theory and observation, is an impossible task. According to his view, theory and observation are intimately linked to each other, and no pure observation is ever possible. A position very similar to Popper’s was endorsed by the American pragmatists in the last two centuries with Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. There also are important similarities between what Popper says and William James’ theses. It is clear that if we recognize that the theoretical dimension precedes observation, and if we claim furthermore that scientific theories have a creative character, then we may explain the “jumps” that often take place in the history of science. Later on Feyerabend and his followers have turned philosophy of science into something mysterious and not easily classifiable in philosophical or scientific terms. The anything goes undermines the meaning itself of the discipline. If science is equated to any other dimension of spirit - art, religion, or even witchcraft - the specific and cognitive character of scientific rationality is eliminated. It follows that philosophy of science loses any meaningful role within the field of human knowledge, while even philosophy as such becomes more similar to a joke than to a serious endeavor.