Reference50 articles.
1. Banks, J.S., J. Ledyard, and D. Porter. 1989. Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach. RAND Journal of Economics 20: 1–25.
2. Bartholdi, J. III, and J. Orlin. 1991. Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare 8: 341–354.
3. Bartholdi, J. III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. 1989. The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare 6: 227–241.
4. Bichler, M., A. Davenport, G. Hohner, and J. Kalagnanam. 2006. Industrial procurement auctions. In Combinatorial auctions, ed. Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Blumrosen, L., and N. Nisan. 2005. On the computational power of iterative auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM conference on electronic commerce, 29–43. Vancouver: ACM Press.
Cited by
4 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets;SSRN Electronic Journal;2013
2. Mechanism design meets computer science;Communications of the ACM;2010-08
3. Task-technology fit and user acceptance of online auction;International Journal of Human-Computer Studies;2010-01
4. Foundations of Mechanism Design;Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions;2009