1. In their opening chapter, Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin, eds., Advances in Behavioral Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), list a number of these anomalies. See p. 19ff for the discussion of expected utility.
2. They are discussed here and there throughout Camerer et al., eds. (2004) and Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, eds., Choices, Values and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The former has a separate section of several articles on fairness.
3. My game theory was mostly learned from older texts and especially R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957). There have been lots of developments since then, but I don’t find a reason in the next footnotes references to change the comments in the text. John Sutton’s paper “Explaining Everything, Explaining Nothing,” European Economic Review 34 (1990): 505–12, espouses this view of the fragmentary nature of game theory results.
4. Andrew Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green, Microeconomic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), in their extended discussion, offer a more up-to-date account of game theory in economics. A number of the articles in Camerer et al., eds. (2004) provide examples of contemporary applications, as do a number in the recently established journal: Microeconomics.
5. Ted Honderich, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), discusses the nature and role of introspection in his volume’s article of that name.