1. There are interesting differences that stem from which part of the Constitution one conceives of the right as originating, but they are not relevant here. See Mark Strasser, “Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the Right to Travel,” Rutgers Law Review 52 (1999): 553–588
2. and Erika Nelson, “Unanswered Questions: The Implications Oì Saenz v. Roe for Durational Residency Requirements,” Kansas Law Review 49 (2001): 193–220. See also Justice Harlan’s dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson 394 US 618 (1969), 663ff.
3. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 38.
4. See, for example, Christian Tomuschat, “Case C-85/96, María Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of 12 May 1998, Full Court [1998] Ecr I-2691,” Common Market Law Review 37 (2000): 447–457: “Indeed, the European Community has not yet crossed the threshold to a true Social Union, where the peoples of the 15 Member States would be considered as just one community, mutually extending solidarity, where revenues and financial charges are shared irrespective of national boundaries. As yet, the Community enjoys no powers of legislation in the social field... The individual does not acquire social entitlements just by transferring his or her residence to another Member State is he or she does not belong to one of the categories specifically recognized as holders of a right of free movement” (454).
5. Gareth Davies, “Higher Education, Equal Access, and Residence Conditions: Does EU Law Allow Member States to Charge Higher Fees to Students Not Previously Resident?” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 12 (2005): 217–231 and Michael Dougan, “Cross-Border Educational Mobility and the Exportation of Student Financial Assistance,” European Law Review (2008): 723–738.