1. Audi, R. (1983). Foundationalism, epistemic dependence, and defeasability. Synthese, 55(1), 119–139.
2. Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2012). Diagramming phenomena for mechanistic explanation. In N. Miyake, D. Peebles, & R. P. Cooper (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34th annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 102–107).
3. Carusi, A. (2012). Making the visual visible in philosophy of science. Spontaneous Generations, 6(1), 106–114.
4. Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking expertise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
5. de Ridder, J. (2014). Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge. Synthese, 191(1), 37–53.