Abstract
AbstractThis paper attempts a better explanation for the causes of dangerous driving behaviors among “Tro-Tro”(minibus) drivers in Ghana. The current media, policy, and academic coverage of the problem reveals an immutable discourse that considers the behaviors (such as over speeding) as a function of moral failure, indiscipline, or bad attitudes on the part of the drivers. Often little consideration is given to the context of the behaviors and their influences. This paper provides an alternative explanation that considers the behaviors as predictable actions that are systematically connected to the Tro-Tro industry. Tro-Tro drivers operate within a precarious work climate marked by problems such as low wages; cut-throat competition; high level of job insecurity; imposition of non-negotiable throat-cutting daily fees by car owners and harassments from bribe-demanding corrupt police officers. The exigencies of meeting these numerous financial and other demands of their work, not moral failure, are what fuel dangerous driving behaviors among the drivers. Based on this analysis, the present public policy of using penal populism (i.e., heavy fines and prison sentences) to address road trauma in Ghana is ineffective for inducing safer driving behaviors among Tro-Tro drivers. Interventions to reduce road transport problems involving such commercial passenger vehicles in Ghana and other developing countries similarly situated must be broad, more-wider reaching and include initiatives that also address the range of political-economic causes, motivations, and constraints that incentivize the drivers to drive dangerously. The paper contributes to the sustainable development goals of ensuring safe and sustainable transport (SDG 11.2), and reducing deaths and injuries from road accidents (SDG 3.6).
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,General Psychology,General Social Sciences,General Arts and Humanities,General Business, Management and Accounting
Cited by
21 articles.
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