1. Reidhill, J. (2013) Guidance papers on deposit insurance coverage and moral hazard. Presentation at IADI Research Conference; 9–10 April, Basel, Switzerland.
2. The expectation is that such creditors will exercise market discipline by moving their deposits to another bank when they see that the bank is acting too risky for their comfort. The same principle applies to unsecured creditors in resolution situations, discussed below.
3. International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) (2013) Enhanced Guidance for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems: Deposit Insurance Coverage. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, pp. 4–6, Reidhill 1 .
4. Datwati, M. (2013) Enhanced guidance for deposit insurance systems. Presentation to the Research Conference of the International Association of Deposit Insurers; 9–10 April, Basel, Switzerland.
5. European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (2012) Forebearance, resolution and deposit insurance. Reports of the Advisory Scientific Committee, 1 July, p. 14, https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_ASC_1_1207.pdf?b1c7134565e2c50d5760d323fd6c1ec6, accessed 16 July 2013.