1. NSC mig, 12 September 1957, FRUS 1955–7, vol. 19, pp. 593–4; see also Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan, 1986) 2nd edn, p. 69; Garthoff, Assessing the Adversary, p. 33 and fn.92.
2. See a recent excellent study of the Eisenhower administration’s responses to Sputnik, Robert Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
3. The National Security Council did not originally ask the Gaither committee to study the United States nuclear deterrent but to investigate the question of ’Urban Redevelopment’, part of a comprehensive study of civil defence. See FRUS 1955–7, vol. 19, fn.9, p. 463; see also Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 336; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 220; Morton Halperin, ‘The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process’, World Politics, 13:3 (April 1961), pp. 360–84. For the Gaither report, see, FRUS 1955–7, vol. 19, pp. 638–61.
4. Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Prospects for America (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1961), p. 111.
5. Bluth, Soviet Strategic Policy, p. 17; David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 66–7; Zaloga, Target America, p. 149.