1. An important source on the programmes of both sides is John M. Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends since the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1978).
2. Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Is there a strategic arms race?’; ‘Rivals but no “race”’; ‘Optimal ways to confuse ourselves’, Foreign Policy, xv (Summer 1974); xvi (Autumn 1974); xx (Autumn 1975).
3. There were exceptions. Norman Moss recounts the story of a SAC General being given a briefing on counter-force strategies in the 1950s. The briefing drew on Game Theory and had matrices indicating the alternative payoffs. The General needed to look at only one square to know he was against the strategy, the square that showed the number of Soviet casualties. He commented: ‘Counter-force means less Russians dead. So I’m against it.’ Norman Moss, Men Who Play God: The Story of the Hydrogen Bomb (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 260.
4. Donald Brennan, ‘The case for population defense,’ in Johan Hoist and William Schneider (eds.), Why ABM? (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969).
5. On this see Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States: A Counter-Conventional Strategic Problem (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1971).