1. Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been published in ‘Kant, Hegel, en het begrip “immanente kritiek” in de moderne filosofie’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 71/3, 2009, 475–498 (in Dutch) and in ‘Kant and Hegel: Critical Reflections on Reason’, in G. Bertram, D. Lauer, C. Ladou and R. Celikates (eds), Expérience et réflexivité. Perspectives au-delà de l’empirisme et de l’idéalisme (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011), 143–155. The argument of the chapter as a whole draws on the theoretical framework presented in my On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
2. G. W. F. Hegel, ‘On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally, and its Relationship to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular’, translated by H. S. Harris, in G. di Giovanni (ed.), Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 275–291 (hereafter EPC).
3. ‘The Transcendental Analytic accordingly has this important result: That the understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general, and, since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us,’ I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A247–248/B303 (hereafter CPR).
4. I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, translated by G. Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 274.
5. G. W. F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, translated by W. Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1977), 69 (hereafter FK).