1. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 83.
2. Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
3. See D’Agostino, Free Public Reason and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
4. See, for discussion, Fred D’Agostino, ‘Teleology, Value, and the Foundations of Scientific Method’, Methodology and Science 24 (1991): 119–34.
5. Broadly evolutionary approaches—the methods must be truth-conducive because they have survived in competition with other methods—presuppose all sorts of things which are false. See for argument Fred D’Agostino, ‘Transcendence and Conversation: Two Conceptions of Objectivity’, American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 87–108.