1. Categorizing moral theories into “goal-based,” “duty-based,” and “right-based” theories, Dworkin suggests that Rawls’s theory of justice is a right-based theory. See Ronald Dworkin, “The Original Position,” in Reading Rawls, Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, ed. Norman Daniels (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 40, 42. Yet, not only does Rawls dismiss the characterization of his theory of justice as a right-based theory, but also he is not satisfied with Dworkin’s tripartite categorization of moral theories. He prefers to call his theory a “conception-based” or an “ideal-based” view, as there are some other important possibilities.
2. See John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 400n19.
3. W. K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 13.
4. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 21–2, 26.
5. Ibid., pp. 26–8.