1. This chapter draws heavily on my study of American policy in China during World War II, Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–45 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). See also, Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953); Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Great Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1941–1945 (New York: Bantam Books, 1972); Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1953), Stilwell’s Command Problems (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1956), Time Runs out in CBI (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1959); Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1963); E.J. Kahan, The China Hands: America’s Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking, 1975); Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946); John Patton Davies, Dragon by the Tail (New York: Norton, 1972); Joseph Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China: The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service (New York: Random House, 1974); Gary May, China Scapegoat: The DiplomaticOrdeal of John Carter Vincent (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1982); James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); T. Christopher Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931–1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); John W. Garver, The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Xiaoyuan Liu, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Russell Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973); Marc Galicchio, The Cold War Begins: American East Asia Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Stephen MacKinnon and Oris Friesen, China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); For the extreme conservative interpretation of Roosevelt’s China policy, see: Don Lohbeck, Patrick J Hurley (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1956) and Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941–1949 (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1963).
2. Gallup surveys from 1937 on showed large and growing majorities of Americans sympathizing with Japan over Japan. In September 1937, for example, 43 percent of the public saw China as a victim and Japan an aggressor. Only 2 percent of the public sided with Japan in its war with China. In 1938, the spread grew to 59 percent pro-China to 1 percent pro-Japan, with 40 percent undecided. By 1939, the numbers were 74 percent pro-China, 2 percent pro-Japan, and 24 percent undecided. Nevertheless, in mid-1939, only 6 percent of Americans favored fighting Japan on China’s behalf. About half supported imposing strict trade sanctions on Tokyo. On this, see T. Christopher Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931–1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).
3. Hornbeck to Alexander Cadogan, April 13, 1938, FRUS 1938, III, 141-3
4. John Carter Vincent to Hornbeck, July 23, 1938, ibid., 234-7.
5. Transcript of discussion, April 18, 1940, Morgenthau Diaries I, 100–108; Memorandum of conversation with K.P. Li, ibid., 112–18; See “Comment on Draft History of First Burma Campaign,” box 2, Boatner Papers; Transcript of Treasury Department Group Meeting, April 21, 1941, Morgenthau Diaries I,385–94; McHugh to Currie, April 27, 1941, McHugh Papers; Transcript of Treasury Dept. Group Meeting, May 12, 1941, Morgenthau Diaries I, 408–18; Transcript of telephone conv. with Currie, July 10, 1941, ibid., 339–42.