1. The writing of this chapter was supported by the National Science Foundation, Human and Social Dynamics Division, Grant No. 624296. Ellen Gilmore, Dean Rowan, and especially Tess Hand-Bender provided excellent research assistance. From 2001 to 2003,1 was atrial attorney at the Federal Programs Branch ofthe U.S. Department of Justice. As a team member helping to review designations of entities linked to terrorism before their assets were frozen and defend those designations when legal challenges were brought, I interacted with members of the intelligence community. Nothing in this chapter is based on confidential or classified information, and none of my views should be attributed to the Department of Justice.
2. This chapter draws from my longer article on the structure of the intelligence community and its congressional overseers. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, “The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World,” California Law Review 94 (2006): 1655–1744.
3. Bert Chapman, Researching National Security and Intelligence Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004), 234–243.
4. Frederick M. Kaiser, A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options from the 9/11 Commission and Others (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service RL32525, 2004), 1.
5. Glen Hastedt, “Foreign Policy by Commission: Reforming the Intelligence Community,” Intelligence and National Security 22 (2007): 443–472.