1. See General Klaus Naumann, “A New NATO for a New Century,” Address to the Konrad Adenaur Siftung Group, Brussels, October 15, 1997, at
www.nato.int
/docu/speech/1997.
2. On the CJTF as a symbol, see Nora Bensahel, “Separable but not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the Combined Joint Task Force,” European Security 8 (Summer 1999), pp. 52–73.
3. For an early discussion of the NATO CJTF concept, and of CJTFs in general, see Charles Barry, “NATO’s CJTFs in Theory and Practice,” Survival 38 (Spring 1996), p. 82.
4. On the origins of the CJTF, see Terry Terriff, “U.S. Ideas and Military Change in NATO, 1989–1994,” in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 91–116.
5. Then SACEUR General Wesley Clark appears to have been directly connected to actual operational activities during the Kosovo campaign. See General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (Public Affairs: New York, 2001). This had the effect of circumventing, at times, the theater command based at AFSouth in Italy; indeed, this remains the case in regard to NATO’s ongoing operations in Kosovo and Bosnia. Interviews with officers at SHAPE and AFSouth, and members of the International Military Staff.