1. The quote is from Strange, States and Markets, p. 45. It is possible, of course, to define ‘security’ in economic terms, which would imply some discussion of the broader benefits accruing to Japan with regard to an enhanced military role from its economic presence in East Asia. Instead, since our earlier discussion of the concept of structural power made the point that each of the four major structures of power identified by Strange is supported, joined to and held up by the other three, we will simply note the connection and move on. For discussion, see S. Harris, ‘The Economic Aspects of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region’, in D. Ball (ed.), The Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 32–51; and B. Buzan, ‘The Interdependence of Security and Economic Issues in the “New World Order” ’, in Stubbs and Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, pp. 89–102.
2. For a particularly clear and perceptive statement of Japan’s defence ‘problematique’ after the Cold War, but one, nevertheless, that fails to make the distinction between dominance and hegemony, see B. Buzan, ‘Japan’s Defence Problematique’, The Pacific Review, 8 (1995) 25–43.
3. T. Kaifu, ‘Japan’s Vision’, Foreign Policy, 80 (1990) 31–2.
4. See H. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: the New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 69, 5 (1990/91) 91–106.
5. One tenuous but potentially potent component of this argument is that since the Japanese military was not defeated on the field of battle but by a new technology, then Japan was never really ‘defeated’ at all. Rather than the pacifism normally associated with the image of ‘Japan-as-victim’, these types of argument leave plenty of room for a resurgence of militarism into Japanese life. See R. Harvey, The Undefeated (London: Macmillan, 1994). However, the political discourse concerning the militarisation of Japan is extremely complex. For a detailed analysis see Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization.