1. Liu, Hong-ji, “Comments on New Military Revolution with Chinese Characters,” National Defense University Journal 104 (February 1998) pp. 67–69.
2. Gao, Chung-xiang, ed., Theory on New Military Revolution (Beijing: Military Science Press, Beijing, 1996) pp. 19–33.
3. A comprehensive and systematic discussion over the RMA and its impact on Chinese military transformation is presented by Lt. General Huang Xin (PLAAF) in his book Discussion of New Revolution in Military Affairs and Strategic Counter Policies (Lun Xin Junshi Geming Yu Zhanlue Duice). General Huang identified the RMA impact on strategic thinking and war-fighting capabilities as far as the PLA is concerned. He also made suggestions and recommendations for the implementation of RMA concepts to transform PLA, and they are paralleled in many other defense planners. See Huang Xin, Lun Xin Junshi Geming Yu Zhanlue Duice (Beijing: Lian Tien publishing firm, February, 2003) pp. 128–171.
4. Again, many Western PLA experts believe China possesses very limited EW capability either in terms of ECM or in terms of intelligence collection, or even in conducting EW against advanced ECM adversaries. It is witnessed by China’s aggression in seeking advanced EW systems from other countries such as Israel and Russia and its collaboration with Russia to produce improved ECM-capable fighter radar and ECM pods. One can only identify China placing priority on an EW upgrade; little evidence supports that China’s EW capability has been greatly upgraded in recent years. See Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, “Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century,” in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999) pp. 169–205.
5. Chinese IW capability comprises three approaches: first, information acquisition, second, information protection, and third, information attack. It is estimated that China possesses sophisticated information gathering capability through its intelligence gathering networks. China is devoting resources to improve its signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability by building advanced communication satellites and developing mini satellites. Both protective and offensive IW measures have been heavily emphasized in recent years to implement PLA IW doctrine to strike strategic targets to end a conflict quickly by destroying the enemy’s ability to wage war. State Science and Technology Commission (COSTIND) oversees the development of IW capability, and it collaborates closely with Central Space Committee (CSC) and China Aerospace Cooperation (CAC) in policy decision-making as well as system integration. See Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implication for the United States (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999) chapter 3.