1. A powerful expression of this idea is to be found in S. Black (1991), ‘Individualism at an Impasse’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21/3: 347–77.
2. Rawls in his account talks always of peoples rather than states. His reason for this is that we can attribute moral motives to peoples — such as the motive of abiding by the law of peoples — but we cannot attribute moral motives to states. This seems to me and others to be entirely unwarranted — especially as Rawls’s notion of a people here is that of an independent political community and hence is what others standardly call a state. Because of this, I shall ignore Rawls’s own usage and talk simply of states or independent political communities. J. Rawls (1999b), The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 17
3. T. Nagel (2005), ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33/2: 115.
4. J. Rawls (1999a), A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 98–100
5. R. Dworkin (2000), Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1