1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
2. Consensus has not necessarily been reached as to whether the protection of civilians by armed groups is considered public goods (Julia A. Heath et al., “The Calculus of Fear: Revolution, Repression, and the Rational Peasant,” Social Science Quarterly, 81 (2) (2000): 622–633) or selective incentives
3. (Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew A. Kocher, “How ‘Free’ is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” World Politics, 59 (2) (2007): 177–216) for potential collaborators.
4. Gordon Tullock, “The Paradox of Revolution,” Public Choice, 11 (1) (1971): 89–99.
5. See also Allen Buchanan, “Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (1) (1979): 59–82;