1. It turns out that WaMu bondholders as of March 2012 were likely to recover all or nearly all of their value in the end, as a result of litigation. This suggests that some of the market turmoil that ensued from the resolution of WaMu might have been avoidable.
2. The G-SIBs will be grouped into different categories of systemic importance to determine the minimum additional loss absorbency (common equity as a percentage of risk-weighted assets), with the recommended additional capital ranging from a low of 1 percentage point to a high of 3.5 percentage points (for additional information, see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.htm ).
3. For a discussion of the TBTF problem in the context of responses to the global financial crisis by several European countries during this period, see Mullineux, A. (2012) The governance of ‘too big to fail’ banks. In: J.R. Barth, C. Lin and C. Wihlborg (eds.) International Research Handbook on Banking and Governance. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing.
4. Feldman, R.J. and Rolnick, A.J. (1998) Fixing FDICIA: A Plan to Address the Too Big to Fail Problem. Annual Report 1997. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, pp. 2–22.
5. Conover, C.T. (1984) Testimony: Inquiry into the Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2nd Session, 18–19 September and 4 October, pp. 172–391.