1. Philosophical Papers;Moore,1966
2. For a contrasting account of what is involved in the analysis of experience, see Russell, Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript (London: Routledge, 1992). I refer to this work as ‘ToK’.
3. My suggestion that the approach described leads into dead ends now (2014) seems to me too pessimistic. I discuss Wittgenstein on experience, solipsism and language in ‘The Tractatus and the Limits of Sense’, in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, ed. Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 240–75. On the relation between Wittgenstein’s views in the Tractatus and scepticism, realism and idealism, see also Diamond, ‘The Hardness of the Soft: Wittgenstein’s Early Thought about Skepticism’, in Varieties of Skepticism: Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein and Cavell (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), ed. James Conant and Andrea Kern, pp. 145–82,
4. and Diamond, ‘Between Realism and Rortianism: Conant, Rorty and the Disappearance of Options’, The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21 (2014), pp. 56–75.
5. See Ricketts, ‘Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense in the Tractatus’, in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, ed. Hans Sluga and David G. Stern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 59–99.