1. According to Krutzsch and Trapp: “Chemical defence programmes sometimes include threat assessment studies related to new, hitherto unknown, agents (new lethal agents, new incapacitants). When such assessments include research work that borders on what would be undertaken in chemical weapons development, they are no longer consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.” Krutzsch, W. and Trapp, R. Article II: Definitions and Criteria, pp. 73–104, in Krutzsch, W., Myjer, E. and Trapp, R. (eds), The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 93.
2. Meselson, M. and Perry Robinson, J. New Technologies and the Loophole, Editorial, Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin 23 March 1994, Harvard Sussex Program, p. 1.
3. Meselson, M. and Perry Robinson, J. (1994) op.cit., p.1.
4. Meselson, M. and Perry Robinson, J. (1994) op.cit., p. 2.
5. Feakes, D. Workshop Report: Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions CWC Implementation: Balancing Confidentiality and Transparency, 15th–17th May 1998; Tucker, J. Introduction, in Tucker, J. (ed.), The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions, Washington DC: Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001, pp. 1–8; Moodie, M. Issues for the First CWC Review Conference, in Tucker, J. (ed.), (2001) op.cit., pp. 59–66; Sands, A. and Pate, J. CWC Compliance Issues, in Tucker, J. (ed.), (2001) op.cit., pp. 17–22; Kelle, A. (2002) op.cit.; Krutzsch, W. (2005) op.cit.; Krutzsch, W. (2007) op.cit.