Abstract
Understanding prescriptive rules is important for understanding the law given that much of law is prescriptive. This work in legal philosophy aims to promote such understanding by offering an analysis of prescriptive rules. It does so by showing what these rules are and how they operate, distinguishing them from other rule types, and advancing a critical analysis of Joseph Raz’s conception of prescriptive rules. The analysis offered helps to clarify not only the nature of prescriptive rules and their treatment within legal philosophy, but also legal norms that operate by prescribing conduct.
Publisher
University of Public Service Ludovika University Press
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