Recent research suggest that reasoners are able to draw simple logical or probabilistic inferences relatively intuitively and automatically, a capacity which has been termed “logical intuition” (see, for example, De Neys & Pennycook, 2019). A key finding in support of this interpretation is that conclusion validity consistently interferes with judgments of conclusion believability, suggesting that information about logical validity is available quickly enough to interfere with belief judgments. In this paper we examined whether logical intuitions arise because reasoners are sensitive to the logical features of problem or another structural feature that just happens to aligns with logical validity. In three experiments (N = 113, 137, and 122), we presented participants with logical (determinate) and pseudo-logical (indeterminate) arguments and asked them to judge the validity or believability of the conclusion. Logical arguments had determinately valid or invalid conclusions, whereas pseudo-logical arguments were all logically indeterminate, but some were pseudo-valid (possible ‘strong’ arguments) and others pseudo-invalid (possible ‘weak’ arguments). Experiments 1 and 2 used simple Modus Ponens and Affirming the Consequent structures; Experiment 3 used more complex Denying the Antecedent and Modus Tollens structures. In all three experiments, we found that pseudo-validity interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as real validity. Altogether, these findings suggest that whilst people are able to draw inferences intuitively, and these inferences impact on belief judgments, they are not ‘logical intuitions.’ Rather, the intuitive inferences are driven by the processing of more superficial structural features that happen to align with logical validity.