Disposing of Britain's Nuclear Waste: The Corwm Process

Abstract

The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) set up in 2003 was tasked to oversee a review of options for managing UK radioactive waste and to engage the public in choosing a long-term solution with the objective of inspiring public confidence. This paper reviews the Committee's processes against their remit and guidance on public engagement. It shows that CoRWM assumed proof-of-concept for geological disposal, despite the contrary verdict of the Sellafield inquiry, and biased the framing of options against ‘interim storage plus ongoing R&D’ (Netherlands option). CoRWM also failed to propose technical criteria comparable to those used internationally, and to resolve the deep disagreement on timescale between key stakeholders. The paper points out vested interests operated via CoRWM's programme manager (AMEC-NNC) and sees the checking role of Defra's chief scientist as also undermining the proclaimed independence of the Committee. CoRWM did recognise their need to range much wider than scientific and technical issues, introducing concepts of institutional breakdown, volunteerism, and socio-cultural timescales. However, these concepts were not subjected to stakeholder consultation and public judgement. The audit of public and stakeholder engagement omitted questions of procedural norms, imbalance of power, and lack of consultation on novel judgements. Two late ‘show stoppers' were ignored in a desire to complete the task, resulting in a fudged compromise papering over deep divisions between members. Their final choice of ‘Phased Deep Geological Disposal’ expressed qualified confidence in the concept, yet favoured keeping the repository open while continuing R&D into other options. The substantial scientific uncertainties associated with this choice, the problematic process by which this decision was reached, and the concerns associated with the modes of public engagement, mean that their ‘solution’ is more rhetorical than real. The technical problems and requirements for public confidence remain obscured and unresolved. The reasons for this problematic outcome are located in the current UK policy push for substantial new nuclear power plants and in a culture tolerant of vested interest in nuclear policy-making and civil service warping of the science process.