Author:
Briest Patrick,Chawla Shuchi,Kleinberg Robert,Weinberg S. Matthew
Publisher
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Cited by
16 articles.
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1. Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders;2023 IEEE 64th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS);2023-11-06
2. Countering Value Uncertainty via Refunds: A Mechanism Design Approach;SSRN Electronic Journal;2023
3. Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods;Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation;2021-07-18
4. The randomized communication complexity of randomized auctions;Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing;2021-06-15
5. The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximation;Games and Economic Behavior;2021-04