Mean Field Games in a Stackelberg Problem with an Informed Major Player-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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Mean Field Games in a Stackelberg Problem with an Informed Major Player

Published:2024-06-13 Issue:3 Volume:62 Page:1737-1765
ISSN:0363-0129
Container-title:SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
language:en
Short-container-title:SIAM J. Control Optim.

Author:

Bergault Philippe¹,Cardaliaguet Pierre¹^ORCID,Rainer Catherine²

Affiliation:

1. CEREMADE, UMR CNRS 7534, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Place de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France.

2. Univ Brest, UMR CNRS 6205, Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Bretagne Atlantique, 29285 Brest cedex, France.

Publisher

Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM)

Reference41 articles.

1. Optimal Incentives to Mitigate Epidemics: A Stackelberg Mean Field Game Approach

2. T. Başar and G. J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd ed. SIAM, Philadelphia, 1998, https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971132.

3. Mean Field Games with a Dominating Player

4. Strategic advantages in mean field games with a major player

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