Evolution of memes

Author:

Shatsky Kirill1ORCID,Yanovsky Volodymyr1ORCID

Affiliation:

1. V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkiv, Ukraine

Abstract

The paper considers the evolution of a population of individuals, where each one initially possesses a certain number of strategies the memory of which does not exceed a depth of 2. All individuals randomly enter into competition in pairs at each stage of evolution. A random pair of individuals conducts a competition between pairs of all their randomly selected strategies when they are interacting. These strategies compete in pairs according to the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In such struggle, strategies earn evolutionary advantage points according to a given payout matrix. The strategy with the most points wins. Two strategies come into this game twice to negate an impact of the first move. The first game starts by one strategy, the second game starts by another one. The winnings are determined by the outcome of both these games. After this competition the winning strategy of one individual replaces the corresponding losing strategy of another individual. Thus, there is an exchange of more "successful" strategies between individuals with the loss of lost strategies. The evolution of the population of such individuals was carried out until the stage of stationary state. There were established patterns of changes in basic properties of strategies of average individual during evolution. It is shown that in the process of evolution the aggression of an individual increases, tenting to the maximum value. The stationary set of strategies of an individual consists of strategies of maximum memory depth and complexity with a certain number of primitive strategies. The complexity and memory depth of an individual's strategies turns out to be evolutionary beneficial. In the stationary state the number of primitive strategies in an individual depends on their initial distribution to individuals. The paper considers two initial distributions, where the first corresponds to the equal probability of any strategy in the distribution by individuals, and the seconds corresponds to equally probable choice in terms of memory depth. The variety of strategies in the process of evolution decreases significantly, making up only a small part of the initial strategies present in the population.

Publisher

V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University

Subject

General Earth and Planetary Sciences,General Environmental Science

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3