CEO Network Connections and the Timeliness of Financial Reporting

Abstract

SYNOPSIS We investigate the effects of CEO networks on the timeliness of financial reporting. Using a sample of over 2,000 firms for the period 2004–2017, we find that firms led by well-connected CEOs have lower earnings announcement lag, audit lag, and filing (10-K) lag. This timeliness is not at the expense of financial reporting quality and accuracy. These effects are stronger when firms have strong corporate governance and no material internal control weaknesses. Interestingly, the effect of CEO connectedness on timeliness is significant regardless of the intensity of demand for information from institutional investors and analysts but is stronger when information demand is lower. Overall, these findings suggest that improved information environment around well-connected CEOs leads to timely dissemination of high-quality information to the market. JEL Classifications: D85; M42.