Abstract
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of state-level monitoring on municipal governance, focusing on outcomes in financial reporting quality, local corruption, political entrenchment, and municipal financial soundness. I exploit the staggered adoption of fiscal monitoring policies that entail a regular review of municipal financial reports for signs of fiscal distress. I find that introducing these monitoring policies is associated with an increase in the proxies for reporting quality, a decrease in the number of corruption convictions, and a reduction in re-election likelihood for incumbent politicians. Consistent with the purpose of the policies, my evidence shows that fiscal health ratios of municipalities improve after initiating state monitoring. Collectively, my results are consistent with state fiscal monitoring improving several important aspects of municipal governance.
Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.
JEL Classifications: G18; G38; H1; H11; H7; H83; M4.
Publisher
American Accounting Association
Reference90 articles.
1. Abramova,
I.
, J.Gillette, and J.Weber. 2023. Municipal organizational structure and financial reporting quality. (Working paper). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3801262
2. Transparency and accountability: Empirical results for US states;Alt,;Journal of Theoretical Politics,2010
3. Do government audits reduce corruption? Estimating the impacts of exposing corrupt politicians;Avis,;Journal of Political Economy,2018
4. Toward understanding the role of auditing in the public sector;Baber,;Journal of Accounting and Economics,1983
5. Toward a framework for evaluating the role of accounting and auditing in political markets: The influence of political competition;Baber,;Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1990
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献