The Effects of Superior Trust and Budget-Based Controls on Budgetary Gaming and Budget Value

Abstract

ABSTRACT Control systems based on budget-based incentives have long been criticized as promoting budgetary gaming that taints the budgeting process. Yet, Libby and Lindsay (2010) find that, on average, North American managers are obtaining “good” value from their budgeting systems. The current study examines the antecedents of budget value through a partial replication and significant extension of Van der Stede (2000) using survey data collected from a sample of senior business unit managers with budget responsibility. Results indicate that the senior manager's trust in subordinate managers' abilities exhibits a positive direct and indirect (through increased subordinate involvement in decision making) relationship with budget value. While budget emphasis has a negative indirect association with budget value (through budgetary gaming), it has a much larger positive direct relationship, resulting in an overall positive effect. Further, budgetary gaming increases with the use of budget-based bonuses, particularly for capped relative to non-capped plans.