The Timing of Asset Purchases to Achieve Earnings Thresholds

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study examines whether managers use capital investment decisions, and the resulting depreciation expense, to achieve quarterly earnings thresholds. We also address whether these actions merely facilitate short-term earnings management or whether firms may trade off investment decisions to deliver earnings. We posit that managers may view capital expenditures as an alternative for earnings considerations because of the process for capital expenditure decision making and the accounting for these investments. Our findings suggest that managers use discretion over capital expenditures to achieve two well-documented earnings thresholds, but that these decisions largely reverse in the following quarter. We document the deferral of capital expenditures to avoid depreciation for industries where the median useful life averages approximately seven years. Cross-sectional tests also suggest that the use of capital expenditures for achieving thresholds varies depending upon the firm's capital intensity, remaining book value of assets, operating cash flow constraints, CEO horizon, and fiscal quarter. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.