Affiliation:
1. Temple University
2. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Camden
Abstract
ABSTRACT
In this paper we show that supporters reduce donations to nonprofits subsequent to disclosure of high executive compensation. We find evidence consistent with large, sophisticated donors actively seeking out and reacting to compensation information made available in IRS Form 990, while smaller donors react to compensation disclosures in the media. Additional analysis indicates that these results vary systematically across nonprofits, as we find a stronger negative relation in nonprofits classified as more charitable, and a weaker relation in nonprofits that provide services to their donors. In contrast neither grantors nor patrons appear to react to executive compensation disclosures.
Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.
Publisher
American Accounting Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting
Reference57 articles.
1. Compensation to managers of charitable organizations: An empirical study of the role of accounting measures of program activities;Baber;The Accounting Review,2002
2. Balsam, S.
2007. Executive Compensation: An Introduction to Practice & Theory. Available at: http://www.worldatwork.org/bookstore/html/product.jsp?id=9781579631703
3. Accruals management, investor sophistication, and equity valuation: Evidence from 10-Q filings;Balsam;Journal of Accounting Research,2002
4. IRS questions pay of charity executives;Banjo;Wall Street Journal Online,2009
5. Big bucks for theater chiefs draw criticism as sign of excess;Boroff,2008
Cited by
79 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献