The Effect of Risk of Misstatement on the Propensity to Commit Reduced Audit Quality Acts under Time Budget Pressure

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of time budget pressure and risk of misstatement on the propensity of auditors to commit reduced audit quality (RAQ) acts. Understanding the different conditions under which time budget pressure can impact on auditors' behavior is important because of the emphasis on meeting budgets in practice. A 2×2×2 mixed design was used with two between-subjects variables for time budget pressure and risk and a repeated measure for the type of RAQ (accepting doubtful audit evidence and truncating a selected sample). The dependent variable was the propensity to commit RAQ. The results support the contention that, under time budget pressure, the likelihood of RAQ is lower when the risk of misstatement is higher. However, this effect was observed for only one of the two RAQ acts examined, suggesting that these RAQ acts are not seen to be the same by auditors. Different risk responses conditioned on the type of RAQ may be indicative of a strategic response to use of RAQ under time budget pressure.