The Effects of a Shared Interest and Regret Salience on Tax Evasion

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis study examines whether sharing the potential tax savings and the risk of penalties associated with tax evasion with another individual affects a decision maker's willingness to evade taxes. This study also explores whether increasing the salience of potential regret from an adverse audit decreases tax evasion behavior. Using a 2 × 2 experimental design with experienced taxpayers as participants, this study finds that participants are less willing to evade taxes when they share the potential tax savings and risk of penalties with another taxpayer compared to when the reporting decision affects solely the decision maker. Supplemental analysis shows that participants feel that tax evasion is more unethical when a shared interest is present. In addition, this study demonstrates that increasing regret salience from an adverse audit decreases participants' willingness to evade taxes. This study contributes to multiple literature streams, including taxpayer compliance, ethical decision making, and decision making under risk.