A Tale of Two Forecasts: An Analysis of Mandatory and Voluntary Effective Tax Rate Forecasts

Abstract

ABSTRACT Disclosure theory predicts that the likelihood of voluntary disclosures increases with the noise level in mandatory disclosures. We test this prediction by exploiting a unique setting where firms simultaneously provide two forecasts of the same metric—annual effective tax rates (ETRs). We find that managers are more likely to issue voluntary ETR forecasts when mandatory ETR forecasts contain more noise due to tax complexity, suggesting that managers resort to voluntary disclosure when mandatory disclosure constrains their ability to convey private information. Using analysts’ ETR forecast revisions to assess the informativeness of the two ETR forecasts, we find that both forecasts are incrementally informative. In addition, analysts weight voluntary ETR forecasts more heavily, especially when voluntary ETR forecasts are non-GAAP based and when discrete items are present. Overall, we provide evidence on the relation between and the informativeness of voluntary and mandatory disclosures by examining two competing forecasts issued simultaneously.