Affiliation:
1. Jennifer J. Gaver is a Professor at The University of Georgia, University of Georgia, and S. Mary Im is an Assistant Professor at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona.
Abstract
SYNOPSIS
We examine the relation between funding composition and excess CEO compensation in not-for-profit organizations (NFPs). Our sample consists of 105,400 observations from 15,412 unique organizations during 1992 to 2007. The results suggest that excess CEO compensation is negatively related to funding from government grants, government-paid program service revenues, and public donations. Excess CEO compensation is positively related to funding from investment income. Our findings generally support the view that the demand for monitoring by fund providers is associated with agency costs in NFP organizations.
JEL Classifications: D23; L31; M48.
Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the National Center for Charitable Statistics.
Publisher
American Accounting Association
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