Affiliation:
1. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
2. Harvard University
3. The University of Chicago
Abstract
ABSTRACT
We study the role of individual CEOs in explaining corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores. We find that CEO fixed effects explain 59 percent of the variation in CSR scores, whereas firm fixed effects explain 23 percent of the variation in CSR scores. Specifically, firms led by materialistic CEOs have lower CSR scores, fewer strengths, and more weaknesses. Finally, we document that CSR scores in firms with non-materialistic CEOs are positively associated with accounting and stock price performance. In contrast, CSR scores in firms with materialistic CEOs are unrelated to profitability.
JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38.
Publisher
American Accounting Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting
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