Increased privatization of a public resource leads to spread of cooperation in a microbial population

Abstract

ABSTRACT The phenomenon of cooperation is prevalent at all levels of life. In one such manifestation of cooperation in microbial communities, some cells produce costly extracellular resources that are freely available to others. These resources are referred to as public goods. Saccharomyces cerevisiae secretes invertase (public good) in the periplasm to hydrolyze sucrose into glucose and fructose, which are then imported by the cells. After hydrolysis of sucrose, a cooperator retains only 1% of the monosaccharides, while 99% of the monosaccharides diffuse into the environment and can be utilized by any cell. The non-producers of invertase (cheaters) exploit the invertase-producing cells (cooperators) by utilizing the monosaccharides and not paying the metabolic cost of producing the invertase. In this work, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of this cheater-cooperator system. In a co-culture, if cheaters are selected for their higher fitness, the population will collapse. On the other hand, for cooperators to survive in the population, a strategy to increase fitness would likely be required. To understand the adaptation of cooperators in sucrose, we performed a coevolution experiment in sucrose. Our results show that cooperators increase in fitness as the experiment progresses. This phenomenon was not observed in environments which involved a non-public good system. Genome sequencing reveals duplication of several HXT transporters in the evolved cooperators. Based on these results, we hypothesize that increased privatization of the monosaccharides is the most likely explanation of spread of cooperators in the population. IMPORTANCE How is cooperation, as a trait, maintained in a population? In order to answer this question, we perform a coevolution experiment between two strains of yeast—one which produces a public good to release glucose and fructose in the media, thus generating a public resource, and the other which does not produce public resource and merely benefits from the presence of the cooperator strain. What is the outcome of this coevolution experiment? We demonstrate that after ~200 generations of coevolution, cooperators increase in frequency in the co-culture. Remarkably, in all parallel lines of our experiment, this is obtained via duplication of regions which likely allow greater privatization of glucose and fructose. Thus, increased privatization, which is intuitively thought to be a strategy against cooperation, enables spread of cooperation.