The Semantic Definition of Truth as an Emergent Symbol of Translation Process

Abstract

In their attempt to provide formal accounts of the concepts of truth and meaning, Tarski and Davidson did not completely purify their theories of cumbersome terms that retain a ‘semantic’ link to the physical reality. However, it can be argued that this burden was not located where the authors and their subsequent commentators generally claimed. The following article aims to demonstrate that a common semantic concept at the heart of their analyses was the idea of translation process. Firstly then, both theories will be briefly reconstructed on the basis of texts by the philosophers themselves. Subsequently, the place of a translative element will be pointed out. Its recognition will provide an interesting answer to several objections against the accounts, also shedding a new light on the outcome of their venture. Yet most importantly, the study shows that Tarski’s and Davidson’s definitions ultimately clinch an inextricable connection between translation and truth – a bond which should be acknowledged in any proper enquiry into the meaning of verity.