The Supporting Structure of Global Security

Author:

Arbatov A.1ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation

Abstract

In the kaleidoscopic events of the current international politics, the destiny of the Russian-American Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the New START Treaty and in Russia – as the START-3 Treaty) has moved to the shadow of the world public opinion. In February 2021, the parties extended the New START Treaty by five years – until February 2026, and launched consultations in Geneva on strategic stability including the scope of the follow-on treaty. However, the U.S. interrupted this dialogue in February 2022 in reaction to the special military operation of Russia in Ukraine. Since then the Western states have been increasing their participation in the conflict by massive deliveries of arms and military equipment to Ukraine, as well as by applying unprecedented economic and political sanctions against Russia. On its part, Russia has declared suspension of participation in the New START Treaty on February 21, 2023 in response to the policy of the West, openly aimed at inflicting “the strategic defeat” on Russia, and for some other reasons. Under these conditions, the uncertain future of the New START Treaty and of the endurance of negotiations of the two nuclear superpowers is prone with the expanding crisis of the strategic stability and global security. Disintegration of this bearing construction would most probably trigger the collapse of other crucial agreements in this sphere: the ban on nuclear testing and prevention of nuclear proliferation, prohibition of deployment of nuclear arms in space and on the seabed. Without strategic arms control it would be impossible to expand the process of nuclear disarmament to the third nuclear-armed states and other kinds of weapons and disruptive military technologies.

Publisher

Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations

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