The Formation of the Concept of Freedom in the Ancient Period

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the formation dynamics of the concept of freedom in the antique philosophic tradition. The author examines the conceptualization of the term of freedom in the context of the emerging subjectivity paradigm together with the terms like guilt, legitimacy, pursuit, spontaneity, determinism, will and mind. The article claims that the shift from the archaic understanding of freedom as a generic feature of ethnic identity and liberation from external compulsion to the interpretation of freedom as a subject’s ability to set goals and self-identify is a result of redefining the connection between such terms as will and mind. There are described the changes in social practices that came from redefining of the above-mentioned terms. The author examines the connection between the classical tradition and the early Christian discourse that set the freedom of will as the highest ontological principle determining the ethical modality of a subject. The late antique Christian discourse links the concept of freedom with the will of a subject. However, unlike the classical tradition, the freedom is not defined through rationality (freedom as a conscious decision leading to a desired goal), but is shifted to the sphere of affect (emotional resonance with the doctrinal provisions of Christianity, whose aim is to merge with the Creator), which set the basis for voluntarist theories. The article argues that the intention of the concept of freedom formed within the antique tradition is relevant to the modern discussions of human freedom, defined in terms of opposition to natural determinism, lack of external compulsion and manipulations, rational goal-setting, opportunity to act differently, subject’s control over the alternative choices, expression of subject’s psychological life.