1. Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion
2. McFadden Daniel L. 2002. “Interstate Wine Shipments and E-Commerce.” presented at Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Possible Anti-Competitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet (October 8).
3. Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 2002. Public Workshop: Possibly Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet. (Oct. 8 Transcript) at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/021008antitrans.pdf
4. It is plausible that whatever price differentials would ordinarily favor offline vs. online shopping might be exacerbated further by offline stores actually raising their prices in response to the proliferation of online wine stores. As argued generally by Salop and Stiglitz (1977) when retailers face consumers with different price elasticities of demands, they will charge different prices in equilibrium. In states where online wine sales are legal, one might envision the retail market for wine as actually two segmented markets (one online and one offline). Offline merchants, knowing that the majority of their consumers are less price sensitive than the typical online consumer, might be able to exploit this differential by raising prices. Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) considered issues such as these in their study of the effects of the 44 Liquormart decision, which eliminated Rhode Island's ban on liquor price advertising.