Promoting Internal Armed Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: The Case of the U.S.-Colombia Relations (Part II)

Abstract

In the present paper the author continues the study of the challenges faced by Colombia in its struggle to overcome the internal armed conflict, as well as the role of the United States in this process. By 2010 the confrontation between the government forces and the armed rebels had reached a breaking point opening the way to a successful conclusion of the Government of Colombia–FARC peace negotiations and the beginning of the country’s post-conflict reconstruction. The paper thoroughly examines the negotiations process, identifies the key disputed issues and the measures outlined for their resolution, including mechanisms of transitional justice, agrarian reform, programmes for demobilization and reintegration of the former combatants. The results of these talks laid the foundation for the historic Peace Accord of September 26, 2016. However, against all hopes and expectations, the agreement failed to bring an end to the long-standing internal conflict in Colombia. The failure of the national referendum, which was designed to approve the agreement, not only revealed deep divisions in the society, but forced the government to make serious concessions to the opponents of the negotiations with FARC. The author emphasizes the growing erosion of the hard-won consensus in the Colombian society, accompanied by the consolidation of the right-wing conservative camp. In this context the role of external sponsors of the peaceful agreement in general and the United States in particular becomes crucial. The paper presents a comparative analysis of approaches to providing aid to Colombia demonstrated by the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The author concludes that despite substantial differences, for both administrations the ultimate objective was national security of the United States. That was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the US foreign aid to Colombia focused primarily on the fight against the illegal production of and trafficking in drugs, while the issues of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction received less attention. Assessing Colombia’s experience in overcoming the internal conflict and the role of the United States in that process, the author concludes that although prioritization of security issues may have a considerable organizing potential, at the same time it may be detrimental to the process of post-conflict reconstruction in general.