Affiliation:
1. School of Economics, University of Sydney
Abstract
I develop two related solution concepts—equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior—that capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not require, but may use, the apparatus of a dynamic process or a protocol that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non‐cooperative and the cooperative approaches to foresight.
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
19 articles.
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1. The reciprocity set;Journal of Mathematical Economics;2024-06
2. Minimal farsighted instability;International Journal of Game Theory;2024-03-10
3. Local farsightedness in network formation;International Journal of Economic Theory;2024-02-14
4. Stability of alliance networks;Games and Economic Behavior;2023-07
5. The Reciprocity Set;2023