Affiliation:
1. LEMMA, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas
2. Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia
Abstract
We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.
Funder
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
6 articles.
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