Affiliation:
1. Multidisciplinary Institute of Enterprise (IME), University of Salamanca
2. School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London
3. Deakin Business School
Abstract
Sufficientarianism is a prominent approach to distributive justice in political philosophy and in policy analyses. However, it is virtually absent from the formal normative economics literature. We analyze sufficientarianism axiomatically in the context of the allocation of 0–1 normalized well‐being in society. We present three characterizations of the core sufficientarian criterion, which counts the number of agents who attain a “good enough” level of well‐being. The main characterization captures the “hybrid” nature of the criterion, which embodies at the same time a threshold around which the worst off in society is prioritized, and an indifference to equality in other regions. The other two characterizations relate sufficientarianism, respectively, to a liberal principle of noninterference and to a classic neutrality property.
Funder
Junta de Castilla y León
European Regional Development Fund
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
1 articles.
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