A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Non-business Real Estate

Abstract

Corporate non-business real estate can be used for the private benefits of controlling shareholders, but is also likely to enhance shareholder wealth. This study explores the impact of corporate governance to address this contradiction, particularly the ownership-control disparity on non-business real estate. We further examine the moderating effect of foreign blockholders on the relationship, then conduct additional analyses on the relationship between non-business real estate and firm value. The results are as follows. First, the disparity has a consistently positive relationship with non-business real estate, which implies that corporate non-business real estate can be utilized for expropriation for the benefit of controlling shareholders. Second, the relationship between the disparity and non-business real estate is mitigated by foreign blockholders. Third, we find that non-business real estate has a negative relationship with firm value. This result implicates the inefficiency of non-business real estate and the possibility of agency problem. Forth, investment in non-business real estate is likely to decrease firm value, compared with investment in core business. This study revisits and extends corporate governance research in terms of non-business real estate by identifying the presence of agency problems and monitoring effects of outside blockholders.