Life after the Coup: The Military and Politics in Post-Authoritarian Philippines

Abstract

This article re-examines the relationship between military intervention on the one hand, and civilian supremacy over the military and the enduring popularity and potency of suffrage and legislative politics, on the other. It shows how these two enduring features of Philippine politics have proven to be quite effective deterrents in neutralizing extremist acts like the coup. As “performative acts,” they help stabilize the Philippine polity by providing an alternative outlet for mass resentment or protest and help to neutralize rival radical rebellions. These also enable a weak state to reform or rejuvenate after periods of profound political crisis, albeit only partially. The coup, however, is a poor rival:its history is far shorter and littered with failures. It has since ceased to be a weapon of choice by military actors who now prefer cacique democracy as the arena in which to pursue their interests. This was evident during the term of Pres. Fidel Ramos and while the military leadership did launch a de facto coup by withdrewing its support for Pres. Joseph Estrada, it immediately reverted to the proverbial backroom deals and patronage relations with its civilian superiors under Pres. Gloria Arroyo.