‘Manually Steered’ Bicameralism of France’s Fifth Republic as Compared to Polish Institutional Designs

Abstract

Abstract The paper deals with the impact of the Senate of France’s Fifth Republic on the functioning of the premier-presidential version of semi-presidentialism. This phenomenon is comparatively explored with reference to Polish bicameralism. The author argues that the two basic variants of French semi-presidentialism – politically congruent executive branch and cohabitation – may be influenced by the bicameral structure. The lack of internal political cohesion within the bicameral legislative causes the government to activate mechanisms of rationalized parliamentarianism. ‘Manual control’ over relations between the chambers may occur under both versions of semi-presidentialism. Hence, semi-presidentialism in France is even more susceptible to the impact of different political configurations. Thus, both variants may be further diversified. The author maintains that as a result of Polish bicameralism’s fairly high resistance to the influence of the political environment, such a kind of diversification in the government’s role is not an inherent feature of premier-presidentialism.